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Preventive detention has been adopted as a measure of counter-
terrorism law in many jurisdictions. It has been authorised under the 
Security Certificate regime in Canada and the Control Order regime in 
United Kingdoms. Since their adoption, the two regimes have become 
objects of much debate. The reason is that they both legalised the use of 
secret evidence and secret hearings in their prosecution. The issue arose 
whether the non-disclosure of such information in a judicial review to 
decide the reasonableness of a control order/a security certificate 
deprives terrorist suspects from a fair hearing. 
This paper explores that question by analysing two landmark cases in 
the United Kingdom and Canada: AF (No 3) and Charkaoui I. The 
paper’s thesis is that the findings of the courts in these two cases are 
reasonable. However, the alternative to full disclosure as adopted by 
both the United Kingdom and Canada – the Special Advocate model – is 
currently too limited. This paper subsequently offers solution for this: the 
judges should have a more active role in investigating the relevant facts 
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I  Introduction 
 
Preventive detention is one of the measures adopted to deal with the threats of 
terrorism. Nations such as the United Kingdom and Canada have been relying on 
it as a legal means to prevent a terrorism attack. The two countries have enacted 
legal regimes for the detention of terrorist suspects – the Control Order regime in 
United Kingdom and the Security Certificate regime in Canada. Many essential 
elements of the two preventive detention regimes are strikingly similar, one of 
which is the type of evidence used in their prosecutions1. Both the Control Order 
and Security Certificate Regime legalised secret hearings (trials with only the 
participation of one party – the State) and secret evidence2 in their judicial 
review process. 
Such prosecution has provoked much debate for it impairs the nature of an 
adversarial system. In an inquisitorial process, the judges have the responsibility 
to investigating the evidence. In contrast, in an adversarial system like in the 
United Kingdom and Canada, the responsibility for investigating, selecting and 
presenting the evidence lies with the two parties involving in the case. Trials in 
this system are based on the oral evidence presented by the two parties before an 
impartial judge to determine the truth of the cases. Therefore, it is essential for 
the suspect to have full access to the evidence and to know all the allegations 
against him/her. Full access to all the evidence presented in the case is a 
safeguard of judicial fairness in an adversarial system.  
Since the adoption of both the Control Order and the Security Certificate 
regime, the main legal issue is whether their prosecutions deprive the terrorist 
suspects3 from judicial fairness4. This paper seeks to answer that question. To do 
so, the paper selects and examines two landmark cases in Canada and the United 
                                                            
1  For the purpose of this paper, the two terms “judicial review process” and “prosecution” will be 
interchangeable throughout the paper. 
2  For the purpose of this paper, “secret evidence” will be interchangeable with “non-disclosure of 
information” and “closed materials”. 
3  For the purpose of this paper, the terms “terrorist suspects”, “effected persons” and “named 
persons” will be interchangeable throughout the paper. 
4  The terms “judicial fairness”, “fair trials” and “fair hearings” will be used interchangeable 
throughout the paper. 
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Kingdom regarding non-disclosure of information in the prosecutions under these 
two preventive detention regimes: AF (No 3)5 and Charkaoui I6. 
This paper first examines the criticism on the prosecutions of Control Order and 
Security Certificate regime before the two cases – AF (No 3) and Charkaoui I. Part 
II of the paper then examines these criticism in light of the judgments in AF (No 3) 
and Charkaoui I.  
The paper subsequently argues that these two judgments are reasonable. 
However, it acknowledges that the Special Advocate model – the alternative to full 
disclosure in the prosecution of preventive detention regime adopted by both the 
United Kingdoms and Canada – is too limited. The paper finally expresses the 
opinion that a more active role of judges can be a solution. Particularly, the judges 
in a control order/security certificate case should be more active in investigating 
the relevant facts of the case to achieve a better balance between individual 
protection and national security.  
 
 
II  The Criticism on the Prosecution of Control Order and Security 
Certificate regime before the case AF (No 3) and Chakaoui I 
In the United Kingdom, the Control Order regime was a preventative measure 
authorised under Chapter 2 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA)7. The 
regime was replaced by the introduction of the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures regime (TPIM) on 15 December 20118. The Control Order 
regime was enacted to protect the general public from the threats of terrorism by 
imposing restrictions on those who were suspected of involvement in terrorism 
activities9. The control orders were applicable to both citizens and non-citizens10. 
Reasonable suspicions only were sufficient to the issuance of a control order11.   
                                                            
5   AF v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] HRLR 26, [2009] UKHL 28  
  [hereinafter  AF(No 3)].  
6   Charkaoui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2007] 1 SCR 350 [hereinafter  
  Charkaoui I]. 
7   Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK), c 2. 
8   Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (UK). 
9   above n 7. 
10   Ibid. 
11   Ibid. 
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In Canada, the Security Certificate regime was equivalent to the Control Order 
regime. The regime was authorised under section 77 of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 2001 (IRPA)12. The Security Certificate is jointly issued 
the two Ministers (Minister of Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness) and only applies to non-citizens13. The purpose of 
detention under the Security Certificate Regime is to determine if the person is 
inadmissible to enter or remain in Canada on the grounds of national security14. 
The certificate will become a removal order when it is determined to be 
reasonable15.  
Except for some minor differences, the Control Order regime in the United 
Kingdom and Security Certificate Regime in Canada worked in a very similar 
manner. One such similarity is their prosecutions which authorise the use of 
secret evidence and secret hearings16. Secret hearings deprived the named 
persons from participating in their trials; secret evidence excluded the named 
persons from full access to the evidence against them. Further, in Canada, before 
the case Charkaoui I, the trials to decide the reasonableness of a security 
certificate were carried out with only the participation of a “designated judge” 
and one party – the Government17.  
Debates on the Control Order and Security Certificate regime evoked as the 
prosecutions under these regimes permit the Government to use secret evidence, 
and therefore the terrorist suspects were excluded from that trial. Secret evidence 
is a departure from the prosecutors’ duty to disclosure of evidence18. This duty is 
an essential requirement of an adversarial system such as United Kingdom and 
Canada19. Academic debates focus on whether permitting the use of secret 
evidence would limit procedural fairness20. 
 
                                                            
12   Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001 c 27, s 77. 
13   Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001 c 27, s 80. 
16  The use of secret evidence and secret hearings is authorised under section 77 of IRPA and  
 Chapter 2 of  PTA.  
17  Charkaoui v Canada, above n 6, at [4]-[10]. 
18  Stephen P Jones “The Prosecutor’s Constitutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence”  
 (1995) 25 University of Memphis Law Review 735 at 737. 
19  Ibid. 
20  David Jenkins “There and Back Again: The Strange Journey of Special Advocates and 
 Comparative Law  Methodology” (2010) 42 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 279 at 280. 
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III   The Criticism Assessed in Light of AF (No 3) and Chakaoui I 
The right to a fair trial is fundamental to the rule of law and to democracy 
itself21.This right applies to both criminal and civil cases, and it is absolute and 
cannot be limited22. The two crucial components of a fair hearing are: the right of 
an individual to know the case against him/her, and the right of an individual to 
effectively challenge the evidence against him/her 23. 
The Control Order and Security Certificate regime authorised using secret 
evidence and secret hearings (the hearings that exclude the terrorist suspects) in 
their prosecutions. Can such prosecution ever be fair? In the light of AF (No 3) and 
Chakaoui I, such prosecution can be fair if the terrorist suspects are provided 
certain requirements of individual protection.  
AF v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 3) was a UK’s landmark 
case under the Control Order regime. Likewise, Chakaoui I was a landmark case 
under the Security Certificate regime in Canada. In both AF (No 3) and Chakaoui I, 
the main question discussed by the courts was whether terrorist suspects were 
deprived from the right to a fair hearing by a prosecution that authorised secret 
evidence and secret hearings.  
 
A AF v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 3) 
1  The facts 
The case AF (No 3) was a joint appeal by three appellants: AF, AN and AE24.  
A control order was first made against AF on 24 May 2006, against AN on 4 
July 2007 and against AE on 15 May 200625. Each control order was made 
pursuant to section 2 of PTA, and was issued on the ground of reasonable suspicion 
that the appellant was, or had been, involved in terrorism-related activities26. These 
control orders involved significant restrictions on liberty of the appellants27. 
                                                            
21  National Council for Civil Liberties “Article 6 Right to a fair hearing” Liberty – protecting civil  
 liberties  and promoting human rights < ww.liberty-human-rights.org.uk>. 
22  Ibid. 
23   Charkaoui v Canada, above n 6, at [53]-[64]. 
24  AF (No 3), above n 5, per Lord Phillips. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid. 
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The judges, who decided the reasonableness of their control orders, relied 
upon secret evidence to make their decisions, and the nature of this evidence was 
not disclosed to the appellants28. The appellants therefore contended that their 
rights to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) was violated29. 
2 The House of Lords’ findings on the prosecution of the Control Order regime 
The issue brought to the House of Lords was whether the Control Order’s 
prosecution applied to the three appellants in this case satisfied the right to fair 
hearings under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)30. Article 6 – the right to fair hearings – reads as follows: 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the 
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
… (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be 
given it free when the interests of justice so require; 
   (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him. 
Answering the question at issue, the House of Lords has consistently ruled that 
in accordance to Article 6, the respondents in control order cases should be 
entitled to the right to disclosure of sufficient information about the allegations 
against them. Consequently, the person named under a control order can give 
effective instructions to their special advocates. If this requirement was satisfied, 
even though the details (or the sources) of the evidence forming the allegations 
                                                            
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid. 
30   European Convention on Human Rights 213 UNTS 221, art 6 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
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in the trials were not made available to the affected persons, these trials would be 
fair31: 
… the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations 
against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those 
allegations. Provided that this requirement is satisfied there can be a fair trial 
notwithstanding that the controlee is not provided with the detail or the sources 
of the evidence forming the basis of the allegations … 
…The Grand Chamber has now made clear that non-disclosure cannot go so far 
as to deny a party knowledge of the essence of the case against him, at least 
where he is at risk of consequences as severe as those normally imposed under 
a control order. 
B Chakaoui I 
1  The facts 
The case Charkaoui I was an appeal at the Supreme Court regarding the 
constitutionality of the Security Certificate Regime32. The case involved Mr. 
Charkaoui, a Moroccan refugee, who has been a permanent resident in Canada33. A 
security certificate for Mr. Charkaoui was signed; he was arrested and detained in 
200334. The evidence against Mr. Charkaoui included secret material35. According 
to IRPA, a summary of the case against Mr. Charkaoui was sent to him36. 
Nonetheless, this summary did not disclose to him the close material because of 
national security concerns37. Mr. Charkaoui found this summary did not reasonably 
inform him of the circumstances giving rise to his security certificate. 
Consequently, he found his right to a fair trial, which was protected under section 7 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was infringed38. 
                                                            
31   AF (No 3), above n 5, at [59]-[65]. 
32  Charkaoui I, abvove n 6, per McLachlin CJC. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 
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2 The Supreme Court’s findings on the prosecution of the Security Certificate 
regime 
The right to a fair hearing was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in their 
analysis as a basic right protected by the principles of fundamental justice39: 
The overarching principle of fundamental justice that applies here is this: 
before the state can detain people for significant periods of time, it must accord 
them a fair judicial process... This principle emerged in the era of feudal 
monarchy, in the form of the right to be brought before a judge on a motion of 
habeas corpus. It remains as fundamental to our modern conception of liberty 
as it was in the days of King John… 
This basic principle has a number of facets. It comprises the right to a hearing. 
It requires that the hearing be before an independent and impartial magistrate. 
It demands a decision by the magistrate on the facts and the law. And it entails 
the right to know the case put against one, and the right to answer that case. 
Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms concerned with whether the 
limit on life, liberty or security of a person has been imposed in a way that 
respects the principles of fundamental justice. The section reads as follows40: 
Life, liberty and security of person 
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
 
The Court acknowledged that “security concerns cannot be used to excuse 
procedures that do not conform to fundamental justice at the s 7 stage of the 
analysis”41. For section 7 to be satisfied, each of the following requirements must 
be substantively satisfied42. The first requirement was the right to a hearing (the 
hearing must be before an independent and impartial magistrate, a decision by 
the magistrate must base on the facts and the law)43. The second requirement was 
                                                            
39   Charkaoui I, above n 6, at [28]-[29]. 
40   Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being  
  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11. 
41  Charkaoui I, above n 6, at [23] 
42  Charkaoui I, above n 6, at [29]. 
43  Ibid. 
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the right to know the case put against one, and the last requirement was the right to 
answer that case44. 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the first requirement – the right to a hearing 
was met:45 
The IRPA process includes a hearing. The process consists of two phases, one 
executive and one judicial. There is no hearing at the executive phase that 
results in issuance of the certificate. However, this is followed by a review 
before a judge, where the named person is afforded a hearing. Thus, the first 
requirement that of a hearing is met. 
The Court then turned on to the other requirements and concluded that only the 
first requirement was satisfied46: 
I conclude that the IRPA scheme meets the first requirement of independence 
and impartiality, but fails to satisfy the second and third requirements, which 
are interrelated here… 
… since the named person is not given a full picture of the case to meet, the 
judge cannot rely on the parties to present missing evidence. The result is that, 
at the end of the day, one cannot be sure that the judge has been exposed to the 
whole factual picture… without knowledge of the information put against him 
or her, the named person may not be in a position to raise legal objections 
relating to the evidence, or to develop legal arguments based on the evidence. 
The named person is, to be sure, permitted to make legal representations. But 
without disclosure and full participation throughout the process, he or she may 
not be in a position to put forward a full legal argument… 
… In the IRPA, an attempt has been made to meet the requirements of 
fundamental justice essentially through one mechanism — the designated judge 
charged with reviewing the certificate of inadmissibility and the detention. To 
Parliament's credit, a sincere attempt has been made to give the designated 
judge the powers necessary to discharge the role in an independent manner, 
based on the facts and the law. Yet, the secrecy required by the scheme denies 
the named person the opportunity to know the case put against him or her, and 
hence to challenge the government's case. 
 
The Supreme Court then concluded that the right to a fair trial, which was 
protected under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, was infringed. 
                                                            
44  Ibid. 
45  Charkaoui I, above n 6, at [30]. 
46  Charkaoui I, above n 6, at [31]. 
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They reasoned that the defendants were not fully aware of the case when they 
only received a summary containing very general information.  
 
III  An Evaluation of the Rulings in AF (No 3) and Chakaoui I 
 
The principle of open justice is considered as fundamental and absolute in a 
modern democratic society 47:  
Every party has a right to know the full case against him, and the right to test and 
challenge that case fully. 
As discussed earlier, the prosecution of either the Control Order or the 
Security Certificate regime was criticised as a one-sided procedure that deprived 
the affected persons from the right to a fair hearing. This proclamation was 
confirmed by the judgments of the British House of Lords and the Canadian 
Supreme Court in the two cases – AF (No 3) and Chakaoui I. This part of the 
paper argues that these judgements are reasonable. 
 A The judgments in Chakaoui I and AF (No 3)endorsed the criminal justice 
approach 
1 How criminal law principles applied in AF v Secretary of State 
The House of Lords held that the ruling by the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case A v United Kingdom 48 answered to 
the question at issue in AF (No 3). The House of Lords found that the 
prosecution under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act49, which was 
discussed in A v United Kingdom, was similar to the prosecution of Control 
Order regime in the sense that they both legalised closed materials. The issue in 
A v United Kingdom was whether the hearings of the terrorist suspects, who were 
detained under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act conformed with the 
standard of fairness set out in Article 5 of ECHR50:  
Article 5 – Right to liberty and security 
                                                            
47  Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] 3 WLR 179 at [3]. 
48  A v United Kingdom (2009) EHRR 29. 
49  Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK). 
50  European Convention on Human Rights 213 UNTS 221, art 5. 
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1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law: 
c. the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; …. 
…3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1.c of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other 
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be 
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be 
entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be 
decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not 
lawful. 
The Grand Chamber held that the procedural requirements of Article 5 were 
infringed when the affected persons were only disclosed general allegations and the 
decision to legalise the detention was based exclusively on closed material. 
Lord Phillips, who delivered the leading judgment in AF v Secretary of State, 
applied the Grand Chamber’s finding into his analysis. He reasoned that the control 
order might potentially impose upon an affected person’s liberty, severe 
restrictions. Consequently, he held that sufficient information about the allegations 
against the affected persons must be disclosed to them, so they can provide 
effective instructions to their special advocates51. 
2 How criminal law principles applied in Charkaoui I 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Charkaoui I reflects criminal justice 
approach. In the lower court decisions, which led to the appeal in Charkaoui I, the 
principles of criminal law relating to disclosure were not applied52. The lower 
courts reasoned that the nature of the prosecution under the Security Certificate 
regime was of administrative law53. Therefore, it is not reasonable to apply the 
principles of criminal law relating to disclosure in the case of Mr. Charkaoui54. 
                                                            
51  AF (No 3), above n 5, at [59]. 
52  Charkaoui II [2008] 2 SCR 326 at [15]. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid. 
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However, the Supreme Court overturned these findings in Charkaoui I. At first 
glance, the Court referred to Professor Hamish Stewart’s opinion that the 
of fundamental justice developed form criminal law context should be applied 
whenever one of the three basic human rights of a person – the life, liberty and 
security was at stake55:  
Many of the principles of fundamental justice were developed in criminal 
cases, but their application is not restricted to criminal cases: they apply 
whenever one of the three protected interests is engaged.  
The Supreme Court continued their analysis, considering many criminal 
statues56 and prior criminal cases57. Finally, the Court ruled that the use of close 
materials in the Security Certificate regime, without satisfactory substitutes for 
knowing and challenging the case against an individual, infringed the human 
rights protected under section 7 of the Charter. 
 
B  The reasonableness of partially importing the standards of evidence in 
criminal law into anti-terrorism law 
Even though anti-terrorism law falls into a different category, it closely 
resembles criminal law as “terrorism is a form of crime in all essential 
respects”58. In fact, it is a common practice to use criminal law as a means to 
prevent and punish terrorism activities. Many jurisdictions had enacted statues 
that reflect the application of criminal law principles in anti-terrorism context. 
An illustration is Part II of Canada Criminal Code59. 
More importantly, as mentioned by the Canadian Supreme Court in Charkaoui 
I, the application of the principles of fundamental justice, which were developed 
in criminal cases, should not be restricted only in the criminal law context60. 
                                                            
55  Charkaoui I, above n 6, at [18]. 
56  Criminal Code 1985 RSC, c C-46, s83, s 487, s 503. 
57  Application Under s 83 28 of the Criminal Code, Re [2004] 2 SCR 248, [2005] 2 WWR 605. 
58  Gary LaFree, James Hendrickson “Build a Criminal Justice Policy for Terrorism Criminology &  
 Public Policy” (October 2007) < www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com>. 
59  Criminal Code 1985 RSC c C-46. 
60  above n 55. 
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These principles should apply in any context where any of the three basic human 
rights – life, liberty and security – was at stake61.  
However, the standards of evidence that is germane to criminal law cannot be 
totally imported into the context of Control Order and Security Certificate regime. 
regime. The reason is the preventive detention regime is of administrative law 
nature. Further, there is and national security involved. In a criminal law context, 
the accused is entitled to full disclosure of all the evidence and participate in the 
trials against him/her. Nevertheless, the prosecution under the Control Order and 
Security Certificate regime is not of a criminal context. Accordingly, the 
requirements of evidence do not need be totally resemble the evidence 
requirements of evidence in criminal cases. In addition, for national security 
concerns, a portion or even all the evidence against the affected persons must not 
be disclosed. Thus, the standards of disclosure in a control order or security 
certificate case ought to be lower than the standards of disclosure in a criminal 
case. When analysing the cases – AF (No 3) and Charkaoui I – both the British 
House of Lords and the Canadian Supreme Court were aware of this factor. The 
British House of Lords only ordered disclosure of relevant information about the 
allegations against the terrorist suspects62. Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court 
did not order full disclosure of evidence, but considered for alternatives in their 
analysis63. 
 
IV  The Alternatives to Full Disclosure  
A recognisably increasing number of legal guidelines concerning the protection 
of human rights in the counter-terrorism context have been issued. These 
guidelines imposed a duty on the States to take responsibility to protect individuals 
from the violations of human rights by counter-terrorism actions. For example, 
                                                            
61  Ibid. 
62  above n 31. 
63  Charkaoui I, above n 6, at [70]-[84]. 
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Article I of the Council of Europe’s Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight 
against Terrorism states in its Preamble:64 
[c] Recalling that a terrorist act can never be excused or justified by citing 
motives such as human rights and that the abuse of rights is never protected; 
[d] Recalling that it is not only possible, but also absolutely necessary, to fight 
terrorism while respecting human rights, the rule of law and, where applicable, 
international humanitarian law; 
[f] Reaffirming the imperative duty of States to protect their populations 
against possible terrorist acts; 
These words clearly illustrate the notion that even in the counter-terrorism 
context, respect and protection of an individual’s human rights should be taken 
into account. To balance national security and an individual’s human rights in 
the prosecution of terrorist suspects, States have adopted several alternatives to 
give the terrorist suspects an effective court challenge. In order to give the 
persons named under a control order or a security certificate an effective court 
challenge, both the United Kingdom and Canada have adopted the Special 
Advocate model as an alternative for full disclosure. This part of the paper will 
examine the Special Advocate model in these countries to argue that this model 
has not yet reached a correct point of balance. Subsequently this paper will offer 
a solution to improve the ability of named persons to have an effective court 
challenge. 
 
A An examination of the Special Advocates Model in UK and Canada 
1 Background information  
In Canada, the decision in Charkaoui I led to the adoption of the Special 
Advocate regime in section 85 of IRPA, amend 200765.  
In the United Kingdom, the Special Advocate was adopted since 1997. It was 
authorised in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act66 as a response 
                                                            
64  Council of Europe Human rights and the fight against terrorism (Council of Europe Publishing, 
 Strasbourg, 2005) at 7. 
65  Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001c 27 amendment 2007, s 85. 
66  Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK). 
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to the decision in Chahal v United Kingdom67. The special advocates were 
described as “litigation friend”, and they are introduced to ensure that the rights of 
of the appellants are protected68. 
In the United Kingdom and Canada, special advocates are nominated to present 
present the terrorist suspects in a control order or security certificate case; in a 
control order or security certificate case, the closed materials may make up a large 
portion of the government’s allegations. In general, special advocates are legal 
counsels who are security-clear and granted access to secret evidence to act on 
behalf of the named persons in a secret hearing69. Also, they had to be independent 
form the named persons70. This Special Advocate model is a legal mean to give the 
affected persons the ability to indirectly participate in the secret hearings and test 
the secret evidence against him/her. The model was introduced with the 
expectation to balance national security and the ability of a terrorist suspect to 
amount to an effective court challenge. 
2 Special Advocate - a limited model 
In brief, the Special Advocate model helps increase judicial fairness for the 
persons named under a control order or security certificate. However, this model is 
currently too limited. 
In a broad sense, the Special Advocate model can improve the ability of the 
named persons to have an effective court challenge. The special advocates 
accomplish two vital functions: first it tests the cogency of the closed materials 
presented by the Government 71, and secondly it examines the nature of the public 
interest at stake when the materials are disclosed 72. The case Charkoui 200973 is an 
illustration of the success of the special advocates in performing these duties. After 
the decision in Charkoui I, the Parliament passed new statute, introducing the 
                                                            
67  Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413. 
68  House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee The operation of the Special Immigration  
 Appeals Commission (SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates, Seventh Report of Session 2004- 
 05 (March 2005). 
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71  Daphne Barak Erez, Matthew C Waxman “Secret Evidence and the Due Process of Terrorist  
 Detentions”  (2009) 48 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 3 at 25. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Charkaoui, Re [2010] 4 FCR 448, 2009 FC 1030, 2009 CF 1030. 
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special advocates into the Security Certificate regime74. Charkoui 2009 was the 
case in which the reasonableness of Mr. Charkaoui’s security certificate was 
reviewed again at the Federal Court under a prosecution that was in accordance 
with the new statute; the judicial review was carried out with the participation of 
special advocates. In this case, the evidence which Ministers asserted could not 
disclosed was sent to the judge and Mr. Charkaoui’s special advocates. The 
advocates challenged the assumptions of the government regarding what material 
must be kept secret. After reviewing the arguments presented by both the 
and Mr. Charkaoui’s special advocates, the court ordered disclosure of this 
evidence on basis that it would not be injurious to national security. The Minister 
therefore chose to withdraw that evidence as permitted under Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act instead of disclosing it75. 
Nevertheless, since the introduction, there have been criticisms on this model. 
One of the main criticisms is the restriction on communication between special 
advocates and terrorist suspects after the secret evidence has been disclosed to 
the special advocates. Both Canada and the United Kingdom require the special 
advocates to gain approvals from the courts to communicate with the named 
persons after they access to the secret evidence76. Furthermore, special advocates 
can represent a named person to participate in a secret hearing, but they are 
unable to share the close materials and get comments regarding the materials 
from that named person. This means that the special advocates and the named 
person cannot effectively work together and has been the subject of criticism in 
both the United Kingdom and Canada77.  
Another criticism on the special advocate regime is the ability of special 
advocates in testing the reasonableness of the secret evidence. The special 
advocates are not given the right to call witnesses or allowed to consult expert 
opinion regarding the close materials in order to keep national secrecy. These 
restraints potentially weaken the special advocate’s ability to test the secret 
evidence presented by the Government. 
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B Increase individual protection in a control order/security certificate case  
The lack of full disclosure of evidence in the context of the control order and 
security certificate regime leads to the impairment of two basic human rights: the 
right of an individual to participate in their trials and the right to challenge the 
evidence held against them. The Special Advocate model was a solution adopted in 
both the United Kingdom and Canada, aiming to give more protection for the 
effected persons and ensure the precision of the final decision. However, as 
discussed earlier, this model is limited. The question is how can we better protect 
individual rights without full disclosure?  This paper argues that the collaboration 
of the special advocate model in conjunction with a more substantive role taken by 
judges can be a possible answer to this question. To be more precise, this paper 
suggests that judges should play more of an active role in investigating a case of 
suspected terrorism.  
1 The problem of the limited role of adversarial judges and the unequal 
positions of parties in a control order/security certificate case 
Under the Control Order and Security Certificate regimes using secret evidence 
in the prosecution of a terrorist suspect places the parties in two unequal positions. 
The Government is the only party who has access to the secret evidence. This 
inequality causes difficulties for terrorist suspects to have an effective court 
challenge. One of the main disadvantages for the suspect is that they are excluded 
from participating in the trials against them. The second disadvantage is that they 
are unable to test the secret evidence held against them.  
Unlike the inquisitorial system, under an adversarial system (such as the United 
Kingdom and Canada), judges do not have the responsibility to collect evidence78. 
The responsibility of preparing evidence for the trials rests with the parties79. The 
adversarial system of Canada and the United Kingdom places the decision maker 
i.e. the judge in a neutral position 80. The judges in an adversarial system do not 
collect any evidence by themselves, but merely rely on the evidence submitted by 
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the parties81. Consequently, legal representation from two parties involving in 
the case is a crucial element of this adversarial system82.  
However, the prosecution under Control Order and Security Certificate regime 
departs from this requirement of an adversarial system. The current regimes 
permit the Government to present secret evidence in the trial against a terrorist 
suspect, and therefore, exclude the terrorist suspect from the right of disclosure 
to such evidence and the right to participate in his/her own trials. As only one 
party (the Government) has access to the secret evidence, the cross-examination 
between parties in an adversarial system is therefore unfairly impaired. This 
potentially affects the accuracy of the judges in making their final decision. 
Furthermore, the burden of proof in a trial of suspected terrorism is rather low. 
The proof is not upon concrete evidence but only to the standard of a reasonable 
suspicion on national security grounds. The current application of secret 
evidence under the adversarial system may therefore increase the risk of 
mistakenly sentencing innocent people. The problem of using close materials in 
an adversarial system has been noted by the Canadian Supreme court in the 
Charkaoui I that: 
an adversarial system, which is the norm in Canada, relies on the parties — 
who are entitled to disclosure of the case to meet, and to full participation in 
open proceedings — to produce the relevant evidence...As Hugessen J. has 
noted, the adversarial system provides “the real warranty that the outcome of 
what we do is going to be fair and just” (p.384); without it, the judge may feel 
“a little bit like a fig leaf”… 
2 A more active role of judges as a solution 
Adversarial judges have limited role to play in investigating the relevant facts 
of the case. This issue is acknowledged as one of the obstacles in a terrorist trial, 
which uses secret evidence. The Supreme Court in Charkaoui I stated that83: 
… an adversarial system, which is the norm in Canada, relies on the parties – 
who are entitled to disclosure of the case to meet, and to full participation in 
open proceedings – to produce the relevant evidence. The designated judge 
under the IRPA does not possess the full and independent powers to gather 
evidence that exist in the inquisitorial process. At the same time, the named 
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person is not given the disclosure and the right to participate in the proceedings 
that characterize the adversarial process. The result is a concern that the 
designated judge, despite his or her best efforts to get all the relevant evidence, 
may be obliged – perhaps unknowingly – to make the required decision based 
on only part of the relevant evidence. 
… Judges of the Federal Court have worked assiduously to overcome the 
difficulties inherent in the role the IRPA has assigned to them. To their credit, 
they have adopted a pseudo-inquisitorial role and sought to seriously test the 
protected documentation and information. But the role remains pseudo-
inquisitorial. The judge is not afforded the power to independently investigate 
all relevant facts that true inquisitorial judges enjoy. At the same time, since the 
named person is not given a full picture of the case to meet, the judge cannot 
rely on the parties to present missing evidence. The result is that, at the end of 
the day, one cannot be sure that the judge has been exposed to the whole 
factual picture. 
One of the basic distinct differences between an adversarial system and 
inquisitorial system is the role of the judge in the investigation of the 
proceedings84. Unlike their adversarial-system counterparts, the judges in an 
inquisitorial system are more active in obtaining evidence85. An inquisitorial judge 
possesses the power to independently investigate all relevant facts of the case; they 
are not passive recipients of information presented in the hearings like the 
adversarial judges. Since the inquisitorial-system judges are active to secure justice 
by their own investigation, legal representation from the side of the defendant is 
not necessarily regarded as indispensable. This is one key advantage of the 
inquisitorial system over the adversarial system if using secret evidence is 
permissible in trials.  
Applying this advantage of the inquisitorial system to the context of Control 
Order and Security Certificate regime, the terrorist suspects will be benefited with 
more judicial fairness’s safeguards. Under the Control Order and Security 
Certificate regimes, terrorist suspects cannot effectively perform their role in the 
cross-examining process as the evidence is not disclosed to them. If the judge who 
reviews the reasonableness of a control order or a security certificate possesses the 
power to independently investigate all relevant facts of the case like a true 
inquisitorial judge, he/she can be the one who cross-examines that secret evidence. 
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For instance, if the judge in a control order or a security certificate case finds the 
secret evidence contradicts with the evidence that he/she found in his/her own 
investigation, that judge can ask for more explanations in support of the secret 
evidence from the Government.  
Additionally, if the judge in a control order or a security certificate case is 
entitled to independently investigate the case, that judge will not need to 
investigate all the facts and evidence that either proves the innocence or guilt of 
the terrorist suspects. That judge only needs to investigate and collect the 
evidence that proves the innocence of the terrorist suspects. The first reason is 
that the evidence proving the guilt of the terrorist suspects is already collected by 
the Government. Secondly, the Government will be the one who is better at 
investigating and collecting such evidence. Take Charkaoui I for example, the 
evidence against Mr. Charkaoui, which presented by the Government, included 
secret evidence. That secret evidence was acquired from Canadian Security 





Courts across many democratic jurisdictions are wrestling with balancing 
national security and individual protection in a trial of terrorist suspects. It has 
been acknowledged by many democracies that individual protection must be 
respected in the fight against terrorism87. The Canadian Supreme Court has noted 
this acknowledgment in the very beginning of the Chakaoui I88: 
Yet in a constitutional democracy, governments must act accountably and in 
conformity with the Constitution and the rights and liberties it guarantees. 
These two propositions describe a tension that lies at the heart of modern 
democratic governance. It is a tension that must be resolved in a way that 
respects the imperatives both of security and of accountable constitutional 
governance. 
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Likewise, the British House of Lords acknowledged in AF (No 3) that89: 
The country must be entitled to defend itself against those who would destroy 
its freedoms. The first responsibility of government in a democratic society is 
owed to the public. It is to protect and safeguard the lives of its citizens. It is 
the duty of the court to do all that it can to respect and uphold that principle. 
But the court has another duty too. It is to protect and safeguard the rights of 
the individual. 
Secret evidence used in the prosecution of preventive detention regimes in the 
United Kingdom and Canada is a controversial subject as it represents a departure 
from the fundamental requirement of an adversarial system. In an adversarial 
system such as that of the United Kingdom and Canada, the foundational principle 
of natural justice is that the defendants are entitled to disclosure of all the evidence 
before the court. Further, the defendants are entitled to challenge that evidence. 
Using secret evidence in a control order or security certificate trial poses a potential 
risk that human rights, primarily the right to a fair trial, are breached. The reason is 
that the terrorist suspects have limited opportunities to challenge the secret 
evidence upon which their control orders and security certificates are issued. 
Both the British House of Lords and the Canadian Supreme Court are of the 
opinion that using secret evidence in the trials under Control Order and Security 
Certificate regime has a potential to deprive the terrorist suspects of a fair trial. 
This is the underlying reason for the judgments in AF (No 3) and Chakaoui I. The 
British House of Lords in AF (No 3) held that the respondents in control order 
cases should be entitled to the right of disclosure of relevant information about the 
allegations against them to enable an effective court challenge. Similarly, the 
Canadian Supreme Court held in Chakaoui I that the summary given to Mr. 
Charkaoui – a summary of very general information on the secret evidence – did 
not enable him a fair trial.  
The two judgments did not put an end to the use of secret evidence in the 
prosecution of Control Order and Security Certificate regime. However, these 
judgments brought a huge change in the prosecution under the two preventive 
detention regimes. They represented the attempt of the authorities to strike a better 
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balance, between national security and individual protection, in a trial of terrorist 
suspects.  
Both Canada and the United Kingdom have been relying on the Special 
Advocate model to provide the terrorist suspects a more effective court challenge 
and to limit the risk of incorrect sentencing innocent people. Nevertheless, this 
model have been criticised by academics as it has many limitations. Firstly, 
special advocates have limited ability to communicate with the terrorist suspects. 
Further, they have a limited role to play in testing the secret evidence. This paper 
has suggested a more active role of judges, particularly a more active role in 
investigation, as a solution to enable more individual protection for the terrorist 
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